Strategy : an introduction to game theory

By: Material type: TextTextPublication details: New Delhi : Viva Books, ©2010.Edition: 2nd edDescription: xvii, 404 p. : ill. ; 24 cmISBN:
  • 9788130915999
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 330.0151 22 WAT-S
LOC classification:
  • HB144 .W37 2008
Online resources:
Contents:
The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location and partnership -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Backward induction and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions; negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location and partnership -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Backward induction and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions; negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation.

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