Strategy :
Watson, Joel
Strategy : an introduction to game theory Joel Watson. - 2nd ed. - New Delhi : Viva Books, ©2010. - xvii, 404 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location and partnership -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Backward induction and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions; negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation.
9788130915999
2007024031
Game theory.
Economics--Psychological aspects.
Strategic planning.
HB144 / .W37 2008
330.0151 / WAT-S
Strategy : an introduction to game theory Joel Watson. - 2nd ed. - New Delhi : Viva Books, ©2010. - xvii, 404 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location and partnership -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Backward induction and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions; negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation.
9788130915999
2007024031
Game theory.
Economics--Psychological aspects.
Strategic planning.
HB144 / .W37 2008
330.0151 / WAT-S