Strategy : an introduction to game theory
By: Watson, Joel.Material type: BookPublisher: New Delhi : Viva Books, ©2010Edition: 2nd ed.Description: xvii, 404 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9788130915999.Subject(s): Game theory | Economics -- Psychological aspects | Strategic planningOnline resources: Table of contents only
|Item type||Current location||Collection||Call number||Status||Date due||Barcode||Item holds||Course reserves|
|Books||IIITD General Stacks||Economics||330.019 WAT-S (Browse shelf)||Checked out||28/10/2019||007870|
|Books||IIITD General Stacks||Economics||330.019 WAT-S (Browse shelf)||Available||007867|
|Books||IIITD General Stacks||Economics||330.019 WAT-S (Browse shelf)||Checked out||28/10/2019||007869|
|Books||IIITD General Stacks||Economics||330.019 WAT-S (Browse shelf)||Checked out||18/10/2019||007868|
|Books||IIITD Reference||Economics||REF 330.019 WAT-S (Browse shelf)||Not For Loan||007831|
|Books||IIITD General Stacks||Economics||330.019 WAT-S (Browse shelf)||Checked out||29/10/2019||007832|
Includes bibliographical references and index.
The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location and partnership -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Backward induction and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions; negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation.