Algorithmic Game Theory [electronic resource] :Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010. Proceedings /
Contributor(s): Kontogiannis, Spyros [editor.] | Koutsoupias, Elias [editor.] | Spirakis, Paul G [editor.] | SpringerLink (Online service).Material type: BookSeries: Lecture Notes in Computer Science: 6386Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2010.Description: VIII, 359 p. 25 illus. online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9783642161704.Subject(s): Computer science | Computers | Numerical analysis | Computer simulation | Computers and civilization | E-commerce | Computer Science | Simulation and Modeling | e-Commerce/e-business | Theory of Computation | Models and Principles | Computers and Society | Numeric ComputingOnline resources: Click here to access online
When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games.